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The Challenge of Change

East Asia in the New
Millennium

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Contents

Preface.....	vii
Contributors	ix
Introduction.....	1
SECTION ONE: Postsocialist China.....	15
1. Present Nationalism and Communist Power.....	19
<i>Richard Baum</i>	
2. The Revival of Chinese Millenarian Movements: The Case of Falun Gong.....	38
<i>Maria Hsia Chang</i>	
SECTION TWO: The Demise of the East Asian Developmental State.....	61
3. The Heuristic Value of the Developmental State Model as Applied to Southeast Asia	67
<i>Danny Unger</i>	
4. The "Free Economy" and the Developmental State: The Changing Ideology and Politics of Japanese Organized Business, 1965–1980	91
<i>Lonny E. Carlile</i>	
5. Japan's Developmental State in the 1990s and Beyond: Has Industrial Policy Outlived Its Usefulness?	113
<i>Marie Anghodoguy</i>	
6. Japan: From Miracle to Mediocrity	134
<i>Teruo Gotoda</i>	
7. How Japan Can Move toward a Third Major Reform.....	156
<i>Peggy K. Takahashi and Toshiya Kitayama</i>	
SECTION THREE: The Normalization of East Asian Relations?	173
8. Hong Kong and the Challenge of Chinese Reunification for U.S.-China Policy.....	178
<i>Suzanne Pepper</i>	
9. Civil Society in South Korean Democratization.....	201
<i>Mikyung Chin</i>	

10. South Korea's Foreign Policy: A Dolphin among Whales?	215
<i>Kongdan (Katy) Oh</i>	
11. Sino-Japanese Relations in Transition.....	235
<i>David Arase</i>	
SECTION FOUR: History Restarted, or Deferred? The U.S. Role in Asia	253
12. The Continuation of the Cold War and the Advent of American Militarism.....	259
<i>Chalmers Johnson</i>	
13. The Okinawa Factor in U.S.-Japan Relations	273
<i>Koji Taira</i>	
14. In Search of Emperor Hirohito: Decision Making and Ideology in Imperial Japan.....	298
<i>Herbert P. Bix</i>	
15. Occurrence at No Gun Ri Bridge: An Inquiry into the History and Memory of a Civil War.....	311
<i>Bruce Cumings</i>	
SECTION FIVE: A Final Tribute to Chalmers Johnson	337
16. Functional Stories: Uses for Communist, Developmental, Military, and Individualist Ideologies	341
<i>Lynn T. White III</i>	
Chronological Bibliography of Chalmers Johnson's Published Works.....	373

Preface

This book grew out of a celebration in March 2000 of Chalmers Johnson's distinguished scholarly career that his former students Mark Tilton, Kongdan Oh, and I organized. In spirit, this volume is done as a festschrift, with former students, colleagues, and friends of Chalmers Johnson contributing essays on contemporary issues in East Asian politics. Those contributors who once studied under Johnson address topics that in most cases he introduced to them. For those contributors who are Johnson's peers and professional contemporaries, and we speak here of the historians Bruce Cumings and Herbert Bix and the economist Koji Taira, one can say they are paying tribute to the inspiration they have drawn from his past and present work.

In a career that is now four decades long and still going strong, Johnson has taken abrupt turns in his work on East Asian political affairs, and remarkably, with each change he produced new path-breaking scholarship that attracted international attention. Attendant with this pattern, and for that portion of his career that he spent teaching at the University of California, Johnson also shaped successive generations of students who then went on to apply themselves both here and abroad as political analysts in academia, think tanks, and government service. It will be noted that the colleagues and former students of Chalmers Johnson who have contributed chapters to this volume became acquainted with him at different stages of his career. But however and whenever each contributor first encountered him, they all have been inspired by Johnson's penetrating insight into East Asian affairs, his careful attention to context, and his academic rigor and integrity. In addition to serving as a tribute to Chalmers Johnson, this volume may also be read as a collection of essays organized around a fundamental premise regarding contemporary East Asian political affairs: the East Asian project of modernity that has yet to be completed. Whether this project will be completed or is even still

relevant in this age of globalization is unknown, but the essays in this volume help us to understand the current prospects of this enterprise at the start of the twenty-first century.

Thanks to the U.S.-Japan Friendship Commission, which sponsored a key part of the celebratory events, and to the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, for electing to publish the revised papers. Cathy Lenfestey took disparate electronic files and coaxed them into a coherent whole. Special thanks to Joanne Sandstrom, whose tireless editorial efforts have made this volume possible.

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Lynn T. White III teaches in the Politics Department, Woodrow Wilson School, and East Asian Studies Program at Princeton. Chalmers Johnson, his thesis adviser, first suggested he might write about Shanghai, so he has published four books on that city and its surrounding area, the latest of which is titled *Unstatelty Power*.

Introduction

It has been more than a decade since the fall of the Berlin Wall, but despite this passage of time, Cold War distortions and divisions have not been swept away in East Asia as they have been in Europe. The prospects for East Asia in this regard are mixed, as the essays in this volume will indicate. Nevertheless, this agenda is the point of departure for the region's development in the new century. If we take a longer view, however, this unfinished business of overcoming the divisions and other anomalies of the Cold War in Asia is embedded in an even more fundamental agenda that shaped the course of East Asia in the twentieth century and will continue to shape the region's politics and history in this new century. We are speaking here of the effort of the East Asian nations to construct their version of modernity.

East Asian elites of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century who sought to free their societies from the predations of Western imperialism and colonialism studied Western political theories and institutions for answers to their predicament.¹ In positive terms, East Asia's progressive elites aimed for a political and economic modernity that was exemplified by contemporaneous Western powers and consisted of such qualities as sovereign statehood, national unity, an effective state apparatus, and an industrialized economy. Of course, there were ideological and institutional variants of Western modernity in the first half of the twentieth century—socialism, fascism, and liberalism—that could be studied and borrowed from, and there was little agreement on the question of what to borrow from the West and what to retain from tradition. But for these East Asian elites, modernity in its broadest and ultimate sense meant transforming their traditional

¹ Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1965).

societies to gain what the advanced Western nations had achieved: wealth and power in the context of a nation-state system.

This is not to suggest that this project was a joint enterprise or that there was agreement among these elites on how to achieve modernity. This vast project was composed of diverse and contentious enterprises that reflected the fact that each nation began its twentieth-century journey in unique circumstances, debated different political and economic development formulas, and progressed through different stages each in its own way. Whether we speak of China under the Guomindang or the Chinese Communist Party, Indonesia under Sukarno or Suharto, or Japan under prewar or postwar constitutions, it can be said that the pattern of twentieth-century political development in East Asia and elsewhere in the Third World, despite a few exceptional episodes, has been oriented toward realizing the broad conception of modernity indicated above.²

Wars played an extraordinary role in shaping twentieth-century East Asia. Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War gave hope to Asian nationalists that the Western imperialist powers could be successfully resisted. World War I gave further encouragement both by weakening the heart of Western imperialism and, through such related phenomena as Wilson's Fourteen Points and the League of Nations, by broadcasting throughout the world the values of democracy and national self-determination. This lent legitimacy to colonial liberation movements throughout the Third World, and it must be borne in mind that in the early twentieth century in East Asia, the only countries that escaped colonial or semicolonial status were Japan and Thailand. The fatal blow to Western colonialism in East Asia was delivered in World War II when Japanese imperialism temporarily displaced Western colonial structures in East Asia. The spectacle of an Asian power defeating Western forces, quickly followed by East Asian disillusionment with Japanese military rule, stimulated the political mobilization of traditional East Asian societies at both the elite and mass levels and strengthened their resolve to fight for national independence. This process was only furthered by the rapid defeat of Japanese imperialism by the power of a United States whose often stated moral purpose was to advance freedom and democracy. Thus, the wrenching events of WW II mobilized

² Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

SECTION ONE

Postsocialist China

In this section Richard Baum and Maria Chang look at the aftermath of socialism's failure in China and highlight the efforts of the present regime to retain its legitimacy during its transition to a market-oriented authoritarian order. Richard Baum's essay in a sense updates Johnson's analysis of Chinese nationalism in the People's Republic of China. In *Peasant Nationalism* Johnson argued that the mass support on which Mao Zedong rode to power was inspired not so much by Communist ideology as by anti-Japanese and, more broadly, antforeign nationalism. Baum notes that after the collapse of communism, Beijing has reverted to promoting Chinese nationalism again in order to retain its legitimacy. In this sense, China has come full circle in the four decades between 1949 and 1989, and China's history of national awakening is restarting after a failed attempt to find an identity and social order based on Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.

Furthermore, Baum suggests that post-Communist Chinese nationalism harbors a deep reservoir of anger and resentment toward Japan and the West, as well as a profound yearning to restore China's lost status as the Middle Kingdom of Asia. The resulting brand of militant, aggrieved nationalism is revealed in passionate individual and crowd behaviors that periodically rage against foreign targets. This development also reflects a domestic atmosphere that is becoming increasingly volatile, fed by pent-up frustrations with official corruption and the unevenly distributed costs and benefits of economic reform. Thus, contemporary Chinese nationalism is a two-edged sword for Beijing. It can be an integrative and legitimating force to replace socialist ideology, but there is a danger it could turn against the Chinese leadership if it fails to deliver achievements that assuage the upsurge in nationalist yearnings.

The kind of culturally and historically informed analysis of contemporary politics that Johnson brought to his own work is

abundantly clear in Maria Chang's essay on the Falun Gong movement. Chang places Falun Gong in the context of the social, political, and spiritual aftermath of the failure of Chinese communism. The Falun Gong movement surprised the world in April 1999 when it surreptitiously mobilized some 10,000–16,000 followers outside the Chinese leadership compound in Beijing to protest the arrest of several local Falun Gong leaders. This movement is portrayed in the media as a puzzling new phenomenon in China, but Chang explains that it is rooted in a long Chinese tradition of millenarianism and secret societies that share cosmological beliefs rooted in Buddhist, Taoist, and Confucian concepts. These sects and movements have often grown, linked up, and become politically mobilized in periods of dynastic decline. Chang argues that Falun Gong must be understood in this context and that this awareness explains the panicked reaction of the Chinese leadership. Her description of Falun Gong cosmology may be the best summary in English to date and makes fascinating reading.

CHAPTER ONE

Present Nationalism and Communist Power

RICHARD BAUM

Forty years have passed since Chalmers Johnson proposed the novel thesis that the principal energy source fueling the Chinese revolution in the 1930s and 1940s was nationalism rather than communism. Johnson famously argued that the key to the Chinese Communists' success in mobilizing mass peasant support was their ability to capitalize upon a groundswell of rural revulsion against Japan's brutal wartime occupation. Patriotism, not class struggle, was the motive force of revolution. And this was true not just in China, Johnson argued, but wherever indigenous Communist movements came to power by their own devices, whether in Yugoslavia, Cuba, or (more than a decade later) Vietnam. In Johnson's view, the key to the success or failure of Communist revolutionaries lay in their ability to capture local nationalist movements in the course of resisting foreign imperialism. By the same token, a myopic tendency to overstress the monolithic nature of communism—and thus to underestimate the potency of Third World nationalism—was seen as a fundamental flaw of America's Cold War "containment" effort.

Forty years later, communism has lost its appeal in China, as elsewhere. Having spent itself defending entrenched (and often corrupt) Leninist oligarchies and stagnant Stalinist command economies, communism is in full global retreat. In China today one encounters scant evidence of the core values of Marx or Mao. Under reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s, appeals to bourgeois greed—"to get rich is glorious"—soon overwhelmed Maoist exhortations to "grasp class struggle." And it has plausibly been argued that only a full decade of market-opening, trade-expanding, wealth-enhancing economic reforms enabled China's embattled Communist leaders to avoid being

CHAPTER TWO

The Revival of Chinese Millenarian Movements: The Case of Falun Gong

MARIA HSIA CHANG

More than two decades have transpired since the initiation of economic reforms in the People's Republic of China (PRC). China has become increasingly capitalist but remains a political dictatorship. Despite the proliferation of private businesses and entrepreneurs, China still lacks a civil society and the corresponding civic culture from which democracy can grow. Although its people are measurably freer in their daily lives, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) does not hesitate to bring all the brutal power of the state against any and all who step beyond its confines of tolerance. Famous dissidents Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan were released, but nameless multitudes still languish in China's *laogai* archipelago. Christians and labor union activists are persecuted, and Tibet remains a police state. In recent years, the Chinese government has intensified its political repression: journalists were arrested and dozens of newspapers shut down;¹ intellectuals were charged with subversion,² and independent-minded newspapers, magazines, and journals were censored;³ members of the embry-

¹ According to Freedom House, a nonpartisan civil liberties organization. Kenneth Neil Cukier, "Press Freedom Widened in 2000, But More Is Needed, Study Says," *Wall Street Journal (WSJ)*, April 30, 2001.

² In May 2001, four Chinese intellectuals were charged with subversion amid an intensifying crackdown on both local and foreign academics: reporter Xu Wei, Web site engineer Yang Zili, geological engineer Jin Haike, and freelance writer Zhang Honghai were targeted for founding the New Youth Study Group, a discussion group focusing on political reforms. Their families were not given details of their alleged crimes, which carry a maximum penalty of ten years in jail. "China Charges Four with Subversion," *Inside China Today (ICT)*, May 21, 2001.

³ An example is the removal, in June 2001, of three editors and a reporter at what has been described as China's best newspaper, *Southern Weekend*. They were removed for publishing articles critical of political corruption, rural conditions, and the widespread crime and violence in Chinese society. An increasing number of

SECTION TWO

The Demise of the East Asian Developmental State

In this section the contributors look at the continuing relevance of the Asian capitalist developmental state as an analytical concept. Is the concept, invented to explain the postwar economic miracle in Japan and elsewhere in East Asia, relevant as an explanation of the economic failures of Japan and other East Asian countries from the 1990s to the present? The contributors in this section look at various aspects of this general question and find changes in domestic and global circumstances that make the capitalist developmental state model inaccurate as a stylized description of reality today. The chapters on Japan explain what has gone wrong and why there are no easy solutions for Japan's problems today.

By the end of the 1960s, economic friction with Japan—notably in textiles and exchange-rate policy—was becoming a serious irritant for the United States, and authors such as Herman Kahn and Robert Guillain were writing on the phenomenal economic success of Japan and the new competitive challenge this posed for the West. Explanations of Japan's success at this time were inadequate, and there was no systematic basis for designing useful counterstrategies. A desire to remedy this deficiency led Johnson to focus on Japanese industrial policy, and this study ultimately produced *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* in 1982.¹ This work introduced the concept of the capitalist developmental state that used industrial policy to speed growth and development. The concept quickly became a compelling new interpretation of Japanese politics and political economy and, more generally, provided a new state-centered approach toward the understanding of East Asian

¹ *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982).

capitalism. The success of this new work drew to Johnson another generation of graduate students eager to study capitalist East Asia's phenomenal economic success, including the contributors to this section.

Johnson argued that Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) had the political autonomy and technical expertise to manage strategic industrial development plans in a market-based economy. For much of the unbroken reign of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that began in 1955 and ended only in 1993, the economic planning bureaucrats of MITI had the power to restrict foreign imports and investments, channel financial and technological resources to targeted industries, and promote export-oriented industrial development. They used these powers to design market-conforming incentives for strategic industries to upgrade and export to rich Western markets. As long as these planning bureaucrats were able to deflect the pleadings of special interests in matters judged to be of national strategic importance, the system could promote a planned developmental purpose within a market-based system.

An unintended consequence of the concept of the Japanese capitalist developmental state was the application of Johnson's state-centered comparative framework to the rest of East Asia. Johnson argued that the concept of the Asian capitalist developmental state could accommodate the cases of South Korea and Taiwan because these had similar institutional characteristics. But as Danny Unger explains in his chapter, Johnson's approach to understanding the economic success of the Northeast Asian capitalist countries opened up an avenue for investigating the successful Southeast Asian capitalist economies by implicitly hypothesizing the applicability of the model to these cases. As Unger shows, a new generation of work on the political economy of Southeast Asia used Johnson's institutional focus as a starting point for their analysis. This work was then able to clarify the more politically penetrated nature of policy making and its relationship to a more transnational and externally dependent private sector in Southeast Asian capitalism.

Turning to look at the case of Japan, Lonny Carlile reveals the tensions inherent in the cooperative relationship between Japanese business and the state by presenting a detailed account of how the Keidanren (Federation of Industrial Organizations) and the Keizai Doyukai (Japan Committee for Economic Development) consistently pressed to give postwar Japanese business greater auton-

omy from detailed state guidance. Carlile explains that these persistent big-business demands for less burdensome state supervision were met by administrative reform measures that gave ground only grudgingly. Carlile's larger point is that Japanese business has slowly advanced its interest in deregulation, but business remains too dependent on the Japanese state and the LDP to achieve a dominant political status in Japan's political economy.

Nevertheless, business and other social interests have had marked success over time in breaching the political autonomy of the state, and their success may help to explain why the Japanese miracle has sunk into economic stagnation and corruption scandals since the 1990s. Johnson has suggested that the LDP and private-sector interests have corrupted the Japanese bureaucracy into using its authority to serve particular and private ends.² Thus, the bureaucracy no longer has the political autonomy to make strategic decisions based on the nation's economic interests. In this sense, the Japanese capitalist developmental state no longer exists because the rudder of strategic bureaucratic guidance on which it depended is now defunct.

Another key aspect of Japan's economic malaise is the difficulty its institutions have had in adapting to the new paradigm of the Internet-based economy. Marie Anchordoguy gets to the heart of this specific failure by looking at Japanese industrial policy in high technology. She argues that Japan's postwar industrial policy worked because of certain prevailing conditions during that period. Anchordoguy points out that in high technology today, however, technological innovation is discontinuous and unpredictable; creativity rather than standardization yields the competitive edge; design, not manufacturing, is the largest source of wealth; Japan's competitors no longer tolerate mercantilist strategies; and Japan's domestic political consensus is gone.

Japan's postwar industrial policy produced massive *keiretsu* (enterprise groupings)—with equally massive inertia. Anchordoguy finds that because Japan's high-tech firms are still embedded in these groupings, these firms are unable to respond to the quickly changing technological and business environment. At the same time, the economic bureaucracies cannot offer effective help in an era when there are no simple growth formulas. Because high-tech sectors remain shackled to larger institutional arrange-

² "Japanese 'Capitalism' Revisited," JPRI Occasional Paper, no. 22 (Cardiff, Calif.: Japan Policy Research Institute, August 2001).

ments designed for a previous era, Anchordoguy concludes, "there is virtually no functioning mechanism for creative destruction in Japan."

This finding leads to the broader question of how this failure could be allowed to persist for so long without even a serious attempt at structural remedies. Teruo Gotoda addresses this question by focusing on the failure of Japan's political leadership. After indicating the serious nature of Japan's economic predicament, he explains how Japan's leadership blundered through Japan's lost decade of the 1990s. The outraged tone of his account reflects the feelings of many Japanese, and it indicates just how profoundly discredited Japan's postwar establishment is today. His harsh analysis would seem to have merit in light of the continuing failure of Japan's political establishment to enact needed reforms, the latest example being the ineffectual tenure of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who gained office in June 2001 by promising voters to destroy the LDP unless it permitted him to make radical reforms. He sacrificed this pledge to stay in power.

Behind this leadership failure, however, is a structural feature of Japanese politics. Peggy Takahashi and Toshiya Kitayama point out that Japan needs a "third great reform" comparable to the comprehensive reforms introduced by the Meiji Restoration in 1868 and the Allied Occupation in 1945, but the authors recognize that such fundamental changes have come only from outsiders overcoming the resistance of those in power. Thus, the question they pose is how external actors such as the United States might be able to promote change. To find an answer they illustrate the mutually dependent relations within which elected politicians, special-interest groups, and bureaucratic regulators exist and show how these groups collude to benefit themselves at the expense of the wider public good. Given the entrenched nature of this structure, Takahashi and Kitayama suggest that outside agents of reform will have to penetrate and manipulate these structures to effect change. It should be noted, however, that these structures are not inevitable. To change the dysfunctional pattern it may be worthwhile considering a strategy aimed either at returning power to the bureaucrats to enable them to whip special interests into line and make the painful decisions that need making or, alternatively, opening up the secretive workings of the iron triangle to effective democratic oversight. In any case, Takahashi and Kitayama reveal the intractable reality those would-be reformers in Japan face today.

CHAPTER THREE

The Heuristic Value of the Developmental State Model as Applied to Southeast Asia

DANNY UNGER

Chalmers Johnson has left his footprint clearly visible in several areas of comparative political studies. This feat itself is a remarkable achievement and can be explained by the quality of his empirical work and his ear for the larger debates reverberating behind the actors and institutions he researches. It also has not hurt that, like his namesake Samuel Johnson, Chalmers Johnson has a gift for *bons mots*. Among those people familiar with his work, and especially for those who have witnessed him holding forth in its support, the simple mention of certain phrases is apt to generate echoes and to elicit a chuckle.

Johnson's model of the capitalist developmental state has had a large influence on comparative political economy scholarship, particularly in work on East Asia. What I find striking, however, is the extent of his influence on comparative political economic studies of the states of Southeast Asia. This is surprising, superficially, because Johnson himself has not worked on the region. Far more important, however, Southeast Asian states are not developmental, so the ubiquity of efforts to apply the developmental state model to the region calls for explanation.

Scholars trying to look at Indonesia or Thailand through the lens of the developmental state were easily confused. The core elements of the model abstracted from the Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese cases could not be made to fit the cases of Southeast Asia.¹ When scholars informed by the model worked in Southeast

¹ Johnson's earliest elaboration of the model, after the publication of *MITI*, appeared in "Japan's Role in Asia and the Pacific: Its Relations with the United States, China, and the USSR," in *Pacific-Asian Issues: American and Chinese Views*, ed.

CHAPTER FOUR

The “Free Economy” and the Developmental State: The Changing Ideology and Politics of Japanese Organized Business, 1965–1980

LONNY E. CARLILE

Research on the capitalist developmental state (CDS) typically focuses on the state and its distinctive role in CDS-variety political economies.¹ By definition, however, the CDS is a *capitalist* political economy and by virtue of this presumes a substantial degree of autonomy on the part of private enterprise and a role for the market mechanism in the allocation and distribution of goods and services. However, the organizational patterns, ideological preferences, and behavioral dynamics of the capitalist side of the CDS remains relatively understudied, and critical issues relating to the role, place, and dynamics of capitalist private enterprise within a CDS political economy have yet to be adequately theorized or analyzed empirically.² This chapter represents a tentative effort in this direction. Taking up the Japanese case specifically, it shifts the analytical lens away from the state and explores how organized business has envisioned the business-state relationship. It looks at the ideological dimension of the business-state relation-

¹ For a thorough discussion and review of the CDS model and associated literature, see Meredith Woo-Cumings, ed., *The Developmental State* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999).

² William Tsutsui in his *Manufacturing Ideology* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998) deals specifically with post-World War II Japanese business ideology but focuses on internal management and labor-management relations. Bai Gao's *Economic Ideology and Japanese Industrial Policy: Developmentalism from 1931 to 1965* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) covers the ideological context of Japanese industrial policy but largely from the standpoint of the state and state-associated intellectuals.

CHAPTER FIVE

Japan's Developmental State in the 1990s and Beyond: Has Industrial Policy Outlived Its Usefulness?

MARIE ANCHORDOGUY

Japan's high-tech sector emerged from relative obscurity in the 1970s to challenge such cutting-edge American corporations as IBM (International Business Machines), AT&T (American Telephone and Telegraph), Texas Instruments, and Intel. With the help of generous government subsidies, protectionist policies, and research cartels, Japanese companies became world leaders in semiconductors, computers, and telecommunications. Beginning in the early 1990s, however, Japan's high-tech sector began to falter. Some analysts have exploited this weakness to suggest that Japanese industrial policy was overstated as an explanation for Japan's high-tech success. Others have dismissed Japan's current high-tech problems as mere symptoms of broader structural problems in its sinking economy, such as the weakness of its financial sector. In this chapter I provide a brief overview of Japan's industrial policy in the high-tech sector and suggest certain conditions that appear to have governed the state's success in specific sectors. I then go on to explain how those conditions changed, undermining the basic foundation for the execution of successful industrial policy. Finally, I look at state policies toward high-tech industries going forward and try to offer my own prognosis of their chances for future success. The overall argument of this chapter is that industrial policies were critical to building a strong electronics sector up until the 1980s, but that when several key conditions changed in the 1980s, policies became much less effective.

CHAPTER SIX

Japan: From Miracle to Mediocrity

TERUO GOTODA

Japan's postwar economic miracle has now been unquestionably dead for a more than a decade. By the end of 2000 the country's accumulated outstanding debts of national and local governments reached 645 trillion yen (U.S.\$6.5 trillion), which is 1.3 times Japan's gross domestic product (GDP). These debts are snowballing rapidly, with interest being added every day, and are being passed on to Japan's diminishing future generations by means of a staggeringly large sum of government bonds. In fiscal 1998, Japan's per capita GDP dropped to eighth in the world after having been first in 1993 and 1994.

What Went Wrong and Why

How did all this happen? What went wrong with the world's second largest economy with its sophisticated production-line technologies and huge personal savings? How can the supposedly democratic government of such an advanced industrial country as Japan be so irresponsible as to deprive its future generations of their legitimate well-being?

For more than a decade, the Japanese people have witnessed appalling governmental mismanagement, not to mention corruption, in dealing with grave economic difficulties. Frightened by the gloomy economic indicators and the specter of pay cuts, unemployment, and the failure of the pension system, the population has simply stopped spending. In addition, the bursting of the real estate and stock market bubbles has forced the shutdown of financial institutions.

Japan's once invincible bureaucracy has proved itself to be dysfunctional, unable for more than a decade to restore the economy even to a level of sustainable growth. The administration of Obuchi Keizo put more than \$1 trillion into the economy to save

CHAPTER SEVEN

How Japan Can Move toward a Third Major Reform

PEGGY K. TAKAHASHI and TOSHIYA KITAYAMA

Japan's economy has been plagued by recession since the early 1990s. Unemployment hit a postwar all-time high of 4.9 percent in 1999 while growth in the gross domestic product (GDP) slowed to negative 2.8 percent in 1998.¹ Mostly in response to Western pressure, Japan instituted financial reforms in the 1990s. Recently, Japan instituted the Deregulation Action Plan. The 1998–2000 plan consists of about six hundred reforms.²

Clearly, the financial and economic reforms in the mid-1990s were ineffective in alleviating Japan's economic condition. Some argue that the reforms were not extensive enough, were too diluted to be effective, and were half-hearted efforts in response to Western pressure.³ Others, however, have identified the continued dominance of key groups within Japan's institutional structure as one of the root causes of Japan's current malaise.⁴

Recently, a number of Japan observers have called for a "third major reform" (the first two being the Meiji Restoration and Japan's postwar reforms).⁵ While the term "reform" does not con-

¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Diplomatic Policy" (updated to Fall 1999) online at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/economy/us/j_us/shihyo.html>. Provides U.S.-Japan comparative statistics on GDP, unemployment, and the consumer price index (CPI). Unemployment reached 5.5 percent in 2002.

² Akira Kawamoto, "Unlocking Japanese Reform," *OECD Observer*, no. 216 (March 1999): 5–7.

³ Lonny E. Carlile and Mark C. Tilton, "Is Japan Really Changing?" in *Is Japan Really Changing Its Ways?* ed. Lonny E. Carlile and Mark C. Tilton (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 197–218.

⁴ Steven K. Vogel, *Can Japan Disengage? Winners and Losers in Japan's Political Economy, and the Ties That Bind Them*, BRIE Working Paper, no. 111 (Berkeley: Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, University of California, 1997); Neal McGrath, "Japan Battles Bureaucrats," *Asian Business* 29 (March 1993): 30–32.

⁵ Diana Helweg, "A Rising Sun?" *Foreign Affairs* 79 (July–August 2000): 26–52.

SECTION THREE

The Normalization of East Asian Relations?

In this section four contributors examine how history is restarting after the Cold War with respect to the following key issues: China's desire for national reunification, South Korea's quest for democracy and eventual reunification with the North, and Sino-Japanese efforts to achieve a new equilibrium in their vitally important bilateral relationship.

Suzanne Pepper examines the complex cross-strait relationship of China and Taiwan in which the United States agrees that peaceful unification is a legitimate goal, while at the same time, it bolsters Taiwan's security against unprovoked aggression by the mainland. Under the Clinton administration, the United States moved to accommodate China's desire to use the one country, two systems formula as a basis for reunification with Taiwan, but Suzanne Pepper explains why both China and the United States under the Clinton administration were naive to expect this approach to work, citing the vast difference between Hong Kong and Taiwan. Insistence on this formula could easily lead to armed resistance by Taiwan and the risk of open conflict between the United States and China. Pepper suggests that a new confederal formula for reconciliation might serve as a better basis for stability and eventual reunification across the Taiwan Strait.

Cold War issues also continue to create special obstacles to stability and democratic development on the Korean peninsula. Progress is being made, however, with South Korea outpacing its northern counterpart with respect to economic and political development. Major milestones were established by the South Korean military's decision in 1987 to allow democracy, followed soon thereafter by the successful hosting of the Seoul Olympics in 1988. By the mid-1990s South Korea had gained membership in the rich-nation's club, the Organization for Economic Cooperation

and Development, a long-coveted recognition of South Korea's successful industrialization. Nevertheless, the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 that forced South Korea to turn to the International Monetary Fund for assistance reminded observers that South Korea's developmental challenges were not quite over. Similarly, if less obviously, with respect to democratic development Mikyung Chin raises questions regarding the state of South Korean democracy. Although from a constitutional standpoint South Korean democracy would appear to be firmly established, she shows how the postwar legacy of a strong state dominating civil society continues to undermine the democratic process. By examining how an influential civic alliance and the state established closer than arms-length relations during the general election of 2000, she suggests that civil society has not yet achieved an autonomous status, nor has the system of checks and balances within the state been fully developed. Therefore, as in the case of its economy, South Korean democracy has arrived, but is not yet fully fledged.

Katy Oh turns our attention to South Korea's efforts under President Kim Dae Jung to promote reconciliation with North Korea using "sunshine diplomacy" while simultaneously advancing its other interests in the complicated context of major power relations in Northeast Asia. She also brings into view South Korea's changing domestic environment stemming from its own democratization. Oh makes many important points about South Korean foreign relations but three stand out.

The first has to do with domestic support for president Kim Dae Jung's sunshine policy. Kim unilaterally imposed this policy soon after he won office, but as South Korean society democratizes and opens up foreign policy to public discussion, his sunshine policy becomes more vulnerable to attack and rollback. Subject to controversy are its expense and the difficulty of measuring its actual effect on the secretive Pyongyang regime. The second key point Oh makes is that the only serious obstacle to harmonious Sino-Korean relations is the United States. Should Sino-U.S. relations come into conflict over Taiwan or missile defense issues, South Korea would be negatively affected by its alliance relations with the United States. The third point is that as peaceful relations with the North develop, the interests of South Korea and the United States may increasingly diverge, and the need for an independent South Korean foreign policy grow. The implication is that after North-South reconciliation, and as China continues

toward economic and political reform, Korea will gradually loosen its ties to the United States and become more tightly connected to its neighbors in Northeast Asia.

The key to whether East Asia develops greater regional interdependence and stronger institutions for the management of regional relations is the Sino-Japanese relationship. Together China and Japan will determine the course of intra-East Asian relations, for good or ill depending on their degree of cooperation or conflict. David Arase analyzes the abnormal state of Sino-Japanese relations, and he suggests that Japan's frustrations in dealing with China may lead Japan to reconsider the fundamental policy that has guided it since normalization of relations in 1972. That policy called for Japan to give active support to China's economic modernization through aid, trade, and investment relations; and since the early 1990s, this policy has included the attempt to build a partnership in approaching regional security and functional issues.

Today, however, Japan is beginning to question the adequacy of this approach. To the extent that Chinese policies today constitute a potential threat to Japan's desire for security, continued prosperity, and an honored position in international society, Japan is beginning to search for additional leverage over China. It is in this context that Japan is beginning to consider such steps as aid cuts, economic sanctions, constitutional revision, and enhanced alliance cooperation with the United States including participation in theater missile defense. The outlook for Sino-Japanese relations is for continuing tension and stress that can be successfully managed so long as cool judgment prevails in both Tokyo and Beijing. The implication of this outlook is that the threat of Sino-Japanese rivalry puts at risk the successful management of such regional issues as the environment, crime, illegal immigration, and drugs, not to mention regional security and economic cooperation.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Hong Kong and the Challenge of Chinese Reunification for U.S.-China Policy

SUZANNE PEPPER

Of all the inherited challenges, none loomed larger on Washington's international calendar in January 2001 than those posed by China. Among those challenges, Taiwan stood out as the single greatest source of potential friction within the United States–China relationship and remains so despite the new multi-faceted conflict agenda created by Washington's post–September 11 war against terrorism. To its credit, the outgoing Clinton administration had finally understood, by its second term in office (1996–2000), that any genuine solution for the Taiwan problem must derive from Chinese politics, not U. S. policy. To the Clinton administration's discredit, however, senior officials misread the context, promoted the wrong political formula, and consequently managed to exacerbate rather than reduce tensions during those years. This episode appears as a small but significant example of the contradictions that frequently prevail between homegrown American policy imperatives and those of people on the receiving end. This particular contradiction also transcends the diverse American perceptions of Chinese reality that were reflected in Clinton's overall shift between 1992 and 2000, from confrontation to accommodation, a diversity reformulated in partisan debate by

Transliteration of Chinese names in this article follows eclectic Hong Kong custom, which sacrifices consistency for accommodation by using whatever spellings the source prefers. This includes pinyin for mainland names, standardized plus local spellings for Taiwan, and the nonstandardized Hong Kong mix for Cantonese. Pinyin is used for all Chinese-language footnote citations, however, regardless of their origin.

CHAPTER NINE

Civil Society in South Korean Democratization

MIKYUNG CHIN

Is the development of civil society promoting democracy in South Korea? In the April 2000 general election, it was widely asserted in South Korean public and academic discourse that "civil society" had emerged as a new force for democracy when some five hundred civic groups joined together to form the Citizens' Alliance for the 2000 General Election (CAGE), which then had success in targeting corrupt politicians for electoral defeat. This unprecedented degree of electoral mobilization by civic groups united under CAGE ignited an explosion of popular expressions of support rooted in widespread frustration with endemic corruption among elected politicians. Since the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in 1987, efforts to consolidate South Korean democracy have confronted undemocratic practices rooted in the previous period of military dictatorship such as corruption, government-business collusion, paternalism, regionalism, cronyism, and factionalism. In answer to public despair, CAGE stepped forward to cleanse the ranks of elected politicians who were seemingly incapable of reforming themselves. Viewed superficially, this emergence of South Korean civil society under the leadership of CAGE would seem to indicate that Korea is on a smooth path toward a mature democracy. But despite the heavy blow CAGE dealt to old-style career politicians, a closer examination of its role in the April 2000 general elections will show that civil society and democracy still have a long way to go in Korea.

CHAPTER TEN

South Korea's Foreign Policy: A Dolphin among Whales?

KONGDAN (KATY) OH

The phrase "a shrimp among whales" has often been used to describe Korea's relations with its neighbors. The historical truth of that description is found in the centuries-old Korean concern about foreign invasion—from neighbors in the north and the east and from "barbarians" across the seas. In the latter half of the twentieth century the Cold War gave new meaning to the phrase as Korea was cut in half by the United States and the Soviet Union, and the two Koreas were then forced to become participants on opposite sides of the Cold War divide. Korea's fate as a sashimi-ed shrimp was due to both its geopolitical position and its tardiness of development. Just as in the late 1800s the failure of the Chosun dynasty to modernize its economy and develop a modern foreign policy provided the opportunity for Japan to control the peninsula, so in the aftermath of World War II did a weakened Korea become subject to the strategies of the two emerging Cold War superpowers.

Shrimp, Dolphins, and Whales

The Republic of Korea (ROK; hereafter, South Korea) has achieved remarkable growth in the years since it was plundered by the Japanese and devastated by the Korean War. One might argue that this economic success outpaced the ability of Koreans to cope politically and socially with their newfound prosperity.

Portions of this chapter were delivered as a paper for the Fourteenth Annual Conference of the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies, October 27–30, 1999, Arlington, Virginia. I would like to thank Ralph C. Hassig for his contributions to this chapter.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Sino-Japanese Relations in Transition

DAVID ARASE

The Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) inaugurated direct relations between a declining imperial China and a successfully modernizing imperial Japan in a way that has divided these two countries up to the present. Despite this bad start, there was a brief period following the war when it seemed possible that a rising Japan might help China modernize.¹ But the Russo-Japanese War (1905) and the annexation of Korea (1910) brought Japanese ambitions in Manchuria and northern China to the fore. By the time of the Twenty-one Demands (1915), which Japan presented to China while the Western powers were distracted by World War I, it was clear that Japan would try to modernize and expand its own power at the expense of China. Japan's takeover of Manchuria in 1931 and initiation of a war against China from 1937 spawned a Chinese sense of betrayal and hatred and helped create the mass nationalism that supported the rise to power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).² Japan was not the only imperial power pursuing its own interests at the expense of a weak China in this period, but the violence, scale, and psychological effect on China of Japan's policies stood far above those of others.

For a generation after the U.S. defeat of imperial Japan, there were no official relations between a reconstructed, democratized Japan that stood on the U.S. side of the Cold War and the People's Republic of China (PRC), established in 1949 under the leadership of the CCP. Postwar U.S. strategic dominance in non-Communist East Asia circumscribed Japan's foreign policy choices, and it was not until 1972, when the United States dropped its objections, that

¹ Marius Jansen, *Japan and China: From War to Peace* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1975).

² Chalmers Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937–1945* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962).

SECTION FOUR

History Restarted, or Deferred? The U.S. Role in Asia

The chapters in this section openly question the moral, intellectual, and practical implications of present U.S. policy in East Asia. Each of the four contributors examines aspects of this policy, and they show how U.S. efforts to maintain a high level of military presence in East Asia inhibit the dissolution of Cold War distortions and can result in systematic deceptions and grave violations of the democratic rights of others.

The first chapter in this section is by Chalmers Johnson, but before we turn to the nature of Johnson's critique, it is worth noting that Johnson wrote a number of essays and popular commentaries in the first half of the 1990s that help to explain the thinking behind his present critique. For example, he argued that after the Cold War it was unlikely that Japan would continue to be so pliant to U.S. wishes and concerns, and it was equally unlikely that the United States would be understanding and tolerant of Japan's differences of interest and values.¹ He also argued that efforts to contain China's rise to great-power status would be doomed to failure.² He suggested that the United States stand aside from China and Japan, the region's two great powers, which in any case could be expected to have difficult relations. Instead, he suggested that the United States seek partnerships with strategically situated smaller powers such as South Korea and Vietnam, which would naturally support the United States in the comparatively

¹ "History Restarted: Japanese American Relations at the End of the Century," in *Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation or Conflict?* ed. Richard Higgot, Richard Leaver, and John Ravenhill (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993), 39–61.

² "Containing China: The U.S. and Japan Drift toward Disaster," *Japan Quarterly* 43:4 (October–December 1996): 10–18; "The Empowerment of Asia," *Australian Quarterly* 67:2 (Winter 1995): 11–27.

modest but sustainable role of a balancing power in the region.³

What seems to have provoked his critique of U.S. policy that culminated in *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire*⁴ was the global strategy of the U.S. military that became clear from the mid-1990s. Johnson expects this strategy, which requires the United States to establish global military predominance and the role of an “indispensable nation” in every major region, to be a danger to the country’s future. Johnson uses the intelligence concept of “blowback”—the unanticipated consequences of covert overseas operations that end up harming U.S. interests—to explain how past U.S. policies have produced many of the country’s problems today and how this dynamic will worsen if the United States pursues a global imperial project. Johnson also warned in this book—published a year before September 11, 2001—that attempts to impose the U.S. will on societies beyond the country’s collective ability to understand will overtax its resources and expose it to new terrorist threats.

The overly militarized U.S. strategy does not only risk the loss of life and property at home from terrorist reprisals. It also subverts democracy as terrorist blowback and domestic dissent against unconscionable U.S. policies abroad cause the new imperial American state to view an open domestic society based on individual liberties as an unnecessary luxury. The risks abroad include the targeting by terrorists of a vast network of American lives and property, as well as the sacrifice of democratic and human rights principles in our foreign policy to promote an informal empire. Aside from becoming a key voice in the national debate over this strategy, Johnson is also concerned that the American political establishment, having won the Cold War, may have lost its soul to the temptations of overweening pride and power. In this newest stage of his career, Johnson also has hammered on particular injustices such as the exploitation of Okinawa as a virtual U.S. military colony.⁵ Koji Taira, an economist born in Okinawa and a long-time analyst of U.S.-Japan relations, has contributed an essay illuminating the unhappy history of Okinawa in support of Johnson’s campaign to reveal the denial of the basic rights of the Okinawan people. These people originally lived in

³ “Rethinking Asia,” *The National Interest*, Summer 1993, 20–28.

⁴ (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000).

⁵ For example, see *Okinawa: Cold War Island* (Cardiff, Calif.: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999); “Fort Okinawa: Go-banken-sama, Go Home!” *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 52:4 (July/August 1996): 22–29.

an independent kingdom that was seized by Imperial Japan in the nineteenth century. After defeating Japan in World War II, the United States retained these islands for military bases and administered them as a U.S. territory. Since Okinawa's reversion to Japanese sovereignty in 1972, Washington and Tokyo agreed that the U.S. bases could remain, and so today Okinawa hosts two-thirds of U.S. forces in Japan and three-fourths of Japanese land occupied by U.S. bases, a striking burden in view of the fact Okinawa accounts for little more than one percent of Japanese land area. In his chapter, Taira reveals the history of how Okinawa was sold out and exploited by both Washington and Tokyo. Emperor Hirohito makes a cameo appearance in this account as the original instigator of the agreement between the United States and Japan to use Okinawa as a platform for U.S. military forces in Japan, thus saving the rest of Japan from most of the burden of a continuing U.S. military presence. Taira thus explains why the burden of U.S. bases and troop presence in Okinawa should be reduced, if not lifted entirely.

The need to correct incomplete and misleading Cold War histories is also illustrated by two other critical essays in this section. In an essay derived from his book *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, Herbert Bix reveals the real character of Emperor Hirohito, something Washington and Tokyo conspired to conceal in order to quickly rehabilitate postwar Japan as a Cold War ally of the United States.⁶ Bix shows that Hirohito, far from being the apolitical retiring marine biologist depicted in the postwar media, was in fact a militarist who was personally involved in Imperial Japan's foreign policy decisions. Based on Japanese sources that have become available only since Hirohito's death in 1989, Bix describes the Shōwa emperor as "a failed and culpable supreme commander who survived his mistakes." One effect of this official conspiracy to exculpate Hirohito of responsibility for his actions has been to set a pattern of dysfunction and denial of history in postwar Japan. Bruce Cumings offers another example of how Cold War manipulations of history have hindered the healthy development of East Asian nations with his reflections on the effort to establish the historical facts about the No Gun Ri massacre of Korean civilians by U.S. soldiers during the Korean War. He contrasts on the one hand the contemporary efforts of

⁶ Herbert P. Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* (New York: Harper Collins, 2000).

powerful media and political institutions in the United States to deny and cover up U.S. culpability in this episode with, on the other hand, what American war correspondents actually reported during the Korean War and what Korean survivors have said about this incident. Put simply, the U.S. government will not cooperate in establishing a more accurate history of the brutal Korean War because of the negative effect this could have on a continuing U.S. military presence in Korea. His broader point is that, despite U.S. efforts to the contrary, the Korean people will need to recover and review their Korean War experiences before they will be able to overcome this devastating history and find a formula for reunification.

CHAPTER TWELVE

The Continuation of the Cold War and the Advent of American Militarism

CHALMERS JOHNSON

Reflecting their traditional preoccupation with Europe, most American political elites accept as common knowledge that "the Cold War is over." What they really mean is that the Cold War in Europe seemed to end with the breaching of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. From this perspective, there could be no doubt that the United States "won" the Cold War and that it is the sole remaining "superpower." However, these elites tend to ignore or be ignorant of the Cold Wars in East Asia and Latin America and do not appreciate that their own country is the prime reason why both continue at the present time.

Actually, the Cold War was never formally "ended" or concluded in Europe. Instead, the Soviet Union disintegrated because of a combination of three different sets of causes: internal economic contradictions, imperial overstretch, and an inability to reform. These are all conditions that also affect the United States at the present time. The unexpected collapse of the USSR produced a crisis of credibility for the United States. For the first forty years after World War II, the menace of the Soviet Union was the United States's prime justification for its worldwide and multifaceted operations against "communism." When this menace disappeared, it was revealed that during the Cold War the United States had objectives other than just balancing and containing the Soviet Union. The United States was covertly laying the groundwork for its own global domination based on military superiority and economic manipulation under the guise of globalization. The United States had become accustomed to its hegemony over the parts of the world not dominated by the Soviet Union and intended to enlarge its scope when the USSR disappeared.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

The Okinawa Factor in U.S.-Japan Relations

KOJI TAIRA

Okinawa is one of the forty-seven prefectures of Japan, and its residents are Japanese nationals. But the Japanese government does not treat Okinawans and mainland Japanese equally. Okinawans bear a larger share of the burden of Japan's national defense, and the Japanese government does not show much interest in correcting this inequity. The U.S. government goes along with the Japanese government, paying little attention to the harm it is inflicting on Okinawa.

Japan attains its desired level of national defense by military alliance with the United States, and for historical reasons permits the stationing of U.S. troops in Japan and provides bases for them. Two-thirds of the U.S. troops stationed in Japan and three-fourths of Japan's land on which the American bases sit are in Okinawa.

The relative concentration of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa would not matter to Okinawans if Okinawa were a continent. Unfortunately, Okinawa Prefecture is a chain of small islands (Ryukyu Islands), and more than 90 percent of its 1.3 million residents live on Okinawa Island, largest in the Ryukyu chain. The U.S. bases occupy nearly 20 percent of Okinawa Island's land. The already high population density there is made worse by the 20 percent of the land removed from civilian use.

The routine military exercises of the troops threaten the peace and security of civilian life in Okinawa. Noise from the aircraft in the around-the-clock landing and take-off training interrupts

I am grateful to Professor Chalmers Johnson for helping me to overcome, to some extent, my timidity in the analysis and discussion of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. However, I am solely responsible for any error, inadequacy, or inappropriate language that may remain in this chapter.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

In Search of Emperor Hirohito: Decision Making and Ideology in Imperial Japan

HEBERT P. BIX

When I began the research that eventually produced *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*,¹ I was already convinced that the conventional American image of Hirohito was little more than a simplified repeat of the official Japanese portrayal, and far from accurate. I also believed that the study of the entire Shōwa era (1926–89) needed to be reinterpreted by placing the emperor, the imperial institution, and emperor ideology at the very center of events where I was sure they belonged. Reevaluation and correction, however, were not easy.

In late 1945 the Japanese war leaders themselves deliberately destroyed much of the historical record. Many of the documents that survived had been kept shielded from critical examination and remained off-limits throughout Hirohito's entire life—indeed even today many remain off-limits. A fresh search for the real imperial ruler of Shōwa Japan required tedious sifting through diaries and memoirs of persons close to him, as well as through an enormous secondary literature. It also required a dual focus: on the character of a unique political, military, and spiritual leader and on the Japanese society and politics that furnished the context for his life.

The emperor who finally emerged was emphatically not the stock version. That is to say, he was not a passive figurehead who had borne no responsibility for Japan's 1937 expansion of its

This is a slightly revised version of a talk first given at International House, Tokyo, in early 2001.

¹ (New York: Harper Collins, 2000).

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Occurrence at No Gun Ri Bridge: An Inquiry into the History and Memory of a Civil War

BRUCE CUMINGS

Ambrose Bierce once wrote a short story called "An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge." Like the late Joseph Heller and his famous novel *Catch-22*, the recent books by Paul Fussell on his experience in World War II, or the wonderful novels by Tim O'Brien about Vietnam, the realities of the battlefield turned Ambrose Bierce into a specialist in black humor, if not cynicism, about the human condition. Bierce, who was outranked as an American writer a century ago only by Mark Twain, is best known for a handful of short stories—"Owl Creek Bridge," "Chickamauga," "The Mocking-Bird," "Three and One Are One," "An Affair of Outposts"—all of them drawn from his experience in the American Civil War.

That war was the last war to rage back and forth across American territory. Six hundred thousand Americans lost their lives in it, more than the total number of American deaths in all the wars of the twentieth century, from World Wars I and II through Korea and Vietnam. The Civil War pitted brother against brother, son against father, mother against herself. Memories of that war lasted so long that a bitter controversy about the flag of the Confederacy that flew over the South Carolina statehouse ended only in 1999. I first went to the South when I was twelve years old, to spend some time with relatives in Memphis, and my shock at seeing segregationist Jim Crow laws in action was only slightly greater than my shock at finding out I was a Yankee—almost a century after the war ended.

Bierce specialized in surprise endings to his stories, ones that drove home a truth about the human nature of civil war: in "The Mocking-Bird," Private Grayrock of the Federal Army, posted as a

SECTION FIVE

A Final Tribute to Chalmers Johnson

In this concluding section, Lynn White pays tribute to Chalmers Johnson by teasing out the fundamental method behind his brilliant scholarly achievements. In contrast to the discussion of Johnson's scholarship in the introduction, which offered an account of the problem-solving and critical modes of research that Johnson used in his career, White's discussion offers a more focused effort to review the body of Johnson's work and extracts from it the essential method behind Johnson's social science. Along the way, he gives a perspicacious discussion of theory and method in political science.

Although the bulk of Johnson's scholarship has been at the middle or lower range of the ladder of theoretical abstraction, White infers that at the upper range Johnson implicitly uses what is essentially a functionalist theoretical paradigm, although it is an unusually flexible one. White argues that what separates Johnson's functionalism from the classic version propounded by Talcott Parsons is his willingness to take material and situational determinants of action as seriously as the force of dominant norms in a society. White argues that Johnson's kind of functionalism is also superior to rational choice approaches (what White terms "rational actionism") because it can accommodate, as an independent or intervening variable, not just as a dependent variable, the reality of norms as well as the reality of collective agents such as parties, movements, or nations. In addition, White suggests that Johnson's functionalism can produce deductive models with theoretical conditions that logically generate testable propositions (what White calls "first cause" explanations), but unlike rational choice theory, it does so at an appropriate level of abstraction. Finally, this method has the additional advantage of accommodating inductive reasoning, taking outcomes and searching backward for their particular causes (what White calls "final cause" explanations). If one accepts that social reality is much too complex to be

wrapped up into one neat little package, then this kind of social science method, which Johnson and others have shown can generate explanations of phenomena that are compelling to those with both knowledge and reason, should remain a core aspect of contemporary political science.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Functional Stories: Uses for Communist, Developmental, Military, and Individualist Ideologies

LYNN T. WHITE III

The destinies of the world unfold through the consequences, but often the contrary consequences, of the intentions that produce them, like a kite which flies by the opposing forces of the wind and the string.

—Alexis de Tocqueville¹

We begin to treat our adversary's views as ideologies only when we no longer consider them as calculated lies and when we sense in his total behavior an unreliability which we regard as a function of the social situation in which he finds himself. The particular conception of ideology therefore signifies a phenomenon intermediate between a simple lie at one pole, and an error.

—Karl Mannheim²

Chalmers Johnson has published prolifically. He has written almost a dozen major single-author books, half as many edited tomes, and articles on a great variety of subjects in both Asian and comparative politics. Some of these works, such as *Revolutionary Change* (from his years at Berkeley), are explicit efforts to adapt functionalist theory to a new task: the business of understanding revolutions.³ Others, such as his doctoral dissertation "Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power" or his equally famous *MITI*

¹ Alexis de Tocqueville *on Democracy, Revolution, and Society: Selected Writings*, ed. John Stone and Stephen Mennell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 261.

² Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (London: Routledge, 1936), 54.

³ *Revolutionary Change* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).

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